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Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtaining jobs in  high-wage
sectors.  On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectors report using employee referrals
because they help provide screening and monitoring of new employees.  This paper
develops a matching model that can explain the link between inter-industry wage
differentials and use of employee referrals.  Referrals lower monitoring costs because
high-effort referees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lower
efficiency wages.  On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job and applicant
contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads).  In equilibrium, the matching
process generates segmentation in the labor market because of heterogeneity in the size
of referral networks.  Referrals match ‘good’ high-paying jobs to well-connected
workers, while formal methods match less attractive jobs to less-connected workers.
Industry-level data show a positive correlation between industry wage premia and use of
employee referrals.  Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive and
significant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the ‘returns’ to employee referrals, but
insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlled for.  This evidence
suggests referred workers earn higher wages not because of higher unobserved ability or
better matches but rather because they are hired in high-wage sectors.
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I.  Introduction
In their 1962 study of the Chicago Labor Market, Albert Rees and George Schultz
(1970) found that employers in high-wage sectors rely extensively on employee networks
to fill vacancies.  According to the study, high-wage employers prefer hiring through
referrals because they provide screening and monitoring of new employees.  In contrast,
employers in low-wage sectors prefer using formal methods, such as newspaper ads and
employment agencies.
Ethnographic studies of the workplace also document the link between the payment
of wage premia and employee networks.  For example, a study of Boston’s labor market
by Wial (1991) found that workers believe that obtaining a ‘good’ job requires either “luck
or the help of a friend or relative who put[s] in a good word with the boss.”
1  In contrast,
according to the working class youths studied by Wial, low-wage jobs are easily obtained
without the need for personal contacts.
This paper develops an equilibrium matching model that generates a link between
inter-industry wage differentials and use of employee referrals, as suggested by these
accounts.  In the model, workers and employers match through referrals or formal
methods.  The benefit of using referrals is that they lower monitoring costs, since workers
can exert peer pressure on co-workers.  The cost is that this provides fewer contacts for
workers and firms than formal methods.  Since the size of referral networks varies across
firms and workers, there is heterogeneity in the efficiency of referral search. This means
that while firms and workers with large networks prefer to use referrals, others are better
                                                          
1 Workers in Wial’s study considered ‘good’ jobs to be jobs that offered high pay and considerable job
security.  Examples of ‘good’ jobs provided by these employees included jobs in Public Utilities,
Transportation, Repair Services, and Construction, all industries which have been documented to pay wage2
off using formal methods.  Moreover, since referrals lower monitoring costs, firms relying
on referrals find it cheaper to elicit effort by paying efficiency wages than firms using
formal hiring methods.  In equilibrium, the matching process generates segmentation in
the labor market: referrals match ‘good’ high-paying jobs to well-connected workers,
while formal methods match less attractive jobs to less-connected workers.
To test the implications of the model, I match Krueger and Summers’ (1987)
estimates of industry wage premia with estimates from the NLSY on the percent of
workers hired through employee referrals by industry, controlling for (CPS) average
education and experience by industry, and information on industry characteristics (e.g.,
unionization rates, sales, assets, concentration ratios) from the National Organizations
Survey.  The data show positive correlations between industry wage premia and the
percent of workers hired through employee referrals.
Since the correlations based on industry-level data could be capturing the
correlation between industry premia and percent referred and other omitted factors (e.g.,
workers’ unobserved ability in the sector), I also present evidence using individual-level
data from the NLSY.  Fixed-effects estimates of the ‘returns’ to employee referrals are
only slightly lower than OLS estimates, suggesting that referred workers are not earning
higher wages simply because they have higher unobserved ability.  Moreover, fixed-effects
estimates are larger for the sub-sample of industry-switchers, indicating that referrals are
particularly useful for those changing sectors.  On the other hand, the ‘returns’ to referrals
disappear once sector of employment is controlled for, suggesting that referred workers
                                                                                                                                                                              
premia (see, Krueger and Summers, 1987, 1988).  Finally, workers in the study saw ‘good’ jobs as being
scarce, in the sense that there was always an excess supply of entry-level job applicants for these jobs.3
earn higher wages not because of higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather
because of the sectors they are hired into.
The analysis in this paper links together two important strands of literature in labor
economics: research on the inter-industry wage structure and efficiency wages, and
research on the incidence of employee referrals.  The latter literature has documented that
referred workers earn higher wages and have higher productivity and lower quit rates,
without controlling for sector of employment.
2  This work generally argues that referred
workers earn higher wages and have higher productivity because referrals provide
information either to employers about the unobserved quality of workers or to workers
about the quality of matches.
3  The model in this paper suggests instead that referrals
lower monitoring costs, allowing referred workers to obtain high-paying jobs and making
it less likely for them to quit.  There is little empirical evidence, however, examining the
link between use of referrals and firm and industry characteristics.
4  On the other hand, the
literature on the inter-industry wage structure shows persistently higher wages and lower
quit rates in some sectors and lower wages and higher quit rates in other sectors after
controlling for observed human capital characteristics, working conditions, and individual
fixed effects.
5  This paper provides evidence that industry wage premia are correlated with
                                                          
2 The higher wages, higher productivity, lower turnover, and higher tenure of referred workers are
documented by Corcoran et al. (1980), Datcher (1983), Staiger (1990), Simon and Warner (1992) and
Holzer (1997).  These studies, however, do not control for sector of employment.
3 See Saloner (1985) and Montgomery (1991) for explanations of referral use based on unobserved worker
quality and  Staiger (1990) and Simon and Warner (1992) for match quality explanations.
4 Aside from the study of the Chicago labor market by Rees and Schultz (1970), only a study by Holzer
(1997) attempts to relate firm characteristics to use of employee referrals.
5 See, e.g., Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988) who estimate large and significant industry wage premia
using a variety of control strategies with CPS and QES data.  Similarly, Gibbons and Katz (1992) provide
further evidence from the DWS using a sample of approximately exogenous industry-switchers (i.e., workers
displaced by plant closings).  More recently, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) have used matched
employer-employee French data to decompose annual compensation per worker into personal and firm
heterogeneity.  Consistent with the payment of non-competitive wages, they find that firms that pay higher
wages, controlling for person effects, are more productive and more profitable.4
use of employee referrals.  Moreover, the evidence suggests that the reason why referred
workers earn higher wages is not because they have higher unobserved ability or better
matches but because they are hired in high-wage sectors.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II models the matching process and
derives the endogenous split between referral and formal matches in the economy.  Section
III presents empirical evidence on the payment of wage premia to referred workers and
contrasts the evidence against alternative explanations of the ‘returns’ to employee
referrals.  Section IV concludes.
II.  Theoretical Set-up: Matching with Referrals and Formal Search
This section introduces an equilibrium matching model that generates a link
between inter-industry wage differentials and use of employee referrals.  In the model,
workers and firms can search through referrals or formal methods.
6  The benefit of
referrals is that they lower monitoring costs because high-effort referees can exert peer
pressure on co-workers.  The downside of referrals is that they provide fewer contacts for
workers and firms.  Heterogeneity in the size of referral networks, however, implies that
some firms and workers may rely more on referrals while others may rely more on formal
methods.
A.  Structure
Workers can be either employed or unemployed.  The unemployed get
unemployment benefits, b, while searching for a job.  The arrival rate of offers is p(θ)
when searching formally and βip(θ) when searching through referrals, where p(θ) is the5
arrival rate of job offers, θ = v / u is the ratio of vacancy to unemployment rates, and βi is
the arrival rate of encounters with those in one’s social network.  Workers differ in the size
of their social networks.  In particular, the arrival rate of encounters with those in the
network is distributed uniformly over the unit interval.  I assume the matching function is
such that p´(θ) > 0.
Firms can have either filled or vacant jobs.  There is free-entry, so that the expected
value of a vacancy is zero in equilibrium.  Firms face a cost, C, of holding a vacancy,
which can be filled using referrals or formal methods.  The arrival rate of applicants is q(θ)
when using formal methods and γjq(θ) when using referrals, where q(θ) is the arrival rate
of acceptances and γj is the arrival rate of encounters with the network members of firm j’s
employees.  The arrival rate of firms’ encounters with those in their employees’ networks
is distributed uniformly over the unit interval.  I assume q´(θ) < 0.   The separation rate
from all jobs is denoted by λ.
Once jobs are filled, firms pay the wage, wM, that minimizes labor costs per
efficiency unit when hiring through method M, where M=R,F.  Employment contracts are
negotiated in advance and cannot be renegotiated.  Firms paying low wages obtain only φA
units of output from employed shirkers where 1 > φ ≥ 0, while firms paying high wages
elicit worker effort and obtain A units of output per unit of time.  Firms that do not find it
worthwhile to pay efficiency wages to eliminate shirking bargain with workers to share the
economic rents generated from matches.
7  Rents are shared according to Nash bargaining,
                                                                                                                                                                              
6 The model assumes a binary choice between informal and formal search to capture the fact that most firms
and workers concentrate their search by using either personal contacts or formal methods, while few use
other search methods.
7 Frictions in the labor market, imply that matches generate economic rents equal to the sum of the cost of
search and the cost of hiring.6
where π is the bargaining power of workers.  In contrast, firms wanting to elicit effort from
workers pay the efficiency wage which satisfies the no-shirking condition.
8
Once employed, workers choose whether to exert effort, e = ê, or to exert no effort,
e = 0.  Workers’ disutility of work is ê².  Individual effort levels are observed by firms only
with an error, so that there is imperfect monitoring.  Shirkers are caught and dismissed
with probability κ.  In addition, referees can lower firms’ monitoring costs through peer
effects.  The social psychology literature highlights the importance of peer-pressure in both
increasing and reducing effort in work groups, suggesting that workers prefer conformist
behavior at the workplace.
9  Moreover, since current employees are often thought to “put
their reputations on the line” when referring friends, these friends are likely to be specially
prone to peer-pressure from referees.
10  A simple formulation of this idea models peer
pressure as costing ρ( eW − eR )² in terms of worker utility, where eW is the effort level of a
referee and eR is the effort level of a referred worker.
B.  Solution
Choice of Wages
Firms decide whether to offer high wages that motivate workers to produce a high
level of output or to offer low wages.  The firms’ goal is to pay the wage that maximizes
                                                          
8 Due to the problem of observability of effort, it is assumed that firms pay efficiency wages because they
cannot specify an enforceable employment contract, where the wage paid to an individual depends on his
actual effort level.  As in Malcomson (1981) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), the types of contracts
described here are incomplete contracts with discretionary dismissals.  See Malcomson (1981) for a detailed
discussion of the problem of observation and why this generates incomplete contracts.
9 According to this literature, the workplace is often characterized by informal norms among workers that
regulate work effort by setting lower as well as upper limits.  See for example, Roethlisberger and Dickson
(1939), Dalton (1948), Roy (1952), and Jones (1984) for accounts of this kind of behavior.
10 While peer effects within work groups may operate even when workers do not refer each other, peer
effects are likely to be stronger when workers interact both at work and in a social context.7
the lifetime stream of profits of a job filled through method M, JM.  The Bellman equation
for a filled job is
rJM = Q(A) − wM + λ( VM − JM ),
(1)
where Q(A) is revenue which equals A if firms pay efficiency wages and φA if firms pay
bargained wages, and VM is the value of a vacancy filled through method M, where the
Bellman equations for vacancies being filled through referrals and formal methods are
rVR = − C + E[ γjq(θ)( JR − VR ) | R],
(2a)
rVF = − C + q(θ)( JF − VF ).
(2b)
To elicit effort, firms must pay a wage high enough for workers to be indifferent
between working and shirking.  This means the wage has to satisfy a no-shirking
condition, EM
 ≥ SM, where EM and SM are the expected lifetime utilities for an employed
worker and an employed shirker hired through method M.  Lifetime utilities for those
matched through referrals are determined by
rER = wR − ê² + λ( UR – ER ),
(3a)
rSR = wR − ρê² + ( λ + κ )( UR – ER ),
(4a)
where UR is the lifetime utility for an unemployed worker searching through referrals,
rUR = − b + E[ βip(θ)( ER – UR ) | R ].
(5a)
Similarly, lifetime utilities for employed and unemployed workers matched through formal
methods are8
rEF = wF − ê² + λ( UF – EF ),
(3b)
rSF = wF + ( λ + κ )( UF – EF ),
(4b)
where UF is the lifetime utility for an unemployed worker searching formally,
rUF = − b + p(θ)( EF – UF ),
(5b)
Substituting (3a)-(5a) and (3b)-(5b) into the no-shirking condition yields the efficiency
wages, wR
e and wF
e, paid by firms using referrals and formal methods.  Lemma 1 compares
these (all proofs are in the Appendix).




e ) = [ ( ρ +β² ) p(θ)/2 + ( r + λ ) ρ ] ê² / κ > 0,
whereβ is the highest arrival rate of contacts inducing referral search.
Firms using employee referrals pay lower efficiency wages for two reasons.  First,
referrals lower monitoring costs, allowing firms to pay lower efficiency wages to motivate
workers.  High-effort referees are willing to put in a good word for their friends, but since
they “put their reputations on the line” they credibly threaten to impose peer-pressure on
shirking friends.  Second, since referral search is less effective in generating contacts, it is
harder for workers using referrals to find alternative job opportunities and thus firms can
pay lower wages to motivate workers.
Firms may instead choose to pay the market wage and tolerate shirking.  Since
there is frictions in the labor market, matches generate economic rents that are split
between workers and firms according to the following Nash bargaining condition:
(1 − π) ( EM − UM ) = π ( JM − VM ).
(6)9
Substituting the firms’ and workers’ surpluses when using referrals into (6) yields the
market wage paid if hiring through referrals:
wR* = { π[ r + λ + ( 1 −β² )p(θ)/2 ]( φA + C ) + (1−π)[ r + λ + ( 1 −γ² )q(θ)/2 ]b } /
{ r + λ + (1−π)( 1 −γ² )q(θ)/2 + π( 1 −β² )p(θ)/2 }.
Similarly, substituting the formal surpluses into the Nash-bargaining condition yields the
formal market wage:
wF* = { π ( r + λ + p(θ) )( φA + C ) + (1−π)( r + λ + q(θ) )b }/
{ r + λ + (1−π)q(θ) + πp(θ) }.
Lemma 2 compares the market wages paid by firms hiring through referrals and formal
methods.
Lemma 2: Market wages are lower when hiring formally than when hiring through
referrals:
( wF* − wR* ) < 0,
if q(θ) >> p(θ).
Firms filling jobs using method M choose between paying efficiency wages, wM
e,
or market wages, wM*, depending on which maximize the lifetime stream of profits, JM.
Comparing JR for firms paying efficiency and market wages, it follows that firms hiring
through referrals pay efficiency wages if A( 1 - φ ) ≥ ( wR
e – wR* ) and market wages if A(
1 – φ ) < ( wR
e – wR* ).  Similarly, firms hiring formally pay efficiency wages if A( 1 – φ )
≥ ( wF
e – wF* ) and market wages if A( 1 – φ ) < ( wF
e – wF* ).
  Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the difference between efficiency and market wages is
greater when using formal methods than when using referrals, i.e., ( wF
e − wF* ) > ( wR
e −
wR* ).  Consequently, there are three possible configurations of wage choices in
equilibrium:10
Case 1: A( 1 – φ ) ≥ ( wF
e – wF* ) > ( wR
e – wR* ).  Firms hiring through referrals and
formal methods pay efficiency wages.
Case 2: ( wF
e – wF* ) > A( 1 – φ ) ≥ ( wR
e – wR* ).  Firms hiring through referrals pay
efficiency wages and firms hiring formally pay market wages.
Case 3: ( wF
e – wF* ) > ( wR
e – wR* ) > A( 1 – φ ).  Firms using referrals and formal
methods pay market wages.
For the rest of this section I focus on case 2.  In case 1, all workers opt to search
formally since efficiency wages are higher when using formal methods than when using
referrals, and formal methods are also a more efficient search method.  This implies that
no firm will ever find it worthwhile to search through referrals.  In case 3, all firms opt to
hire formally since market wages are lower when using formal methods than when using
referrals and formal methods are also a more efficient search method.  This implies that no
worker will ever find it worthwhile to search through referrals.  This means that the use of
both referrals and formal search may only arise in case 2.
Firms’ Choices of Hiring Methods
In case 2, firms decide between hiring through referrals and paying efficiency
wages or hiring formally and paying bargained wages.  Since the benefit of using referrals
rises with firms’ arrival rates of encounters, γj, firms connected to larger networks prefer to
use referrals while firms with smaller networks prefer to use formal methods.  The critical
value of the arrival rate of encounters which makes a firm indifferent between the two
methods is
γ = { ( r + λ )( φA − wF* + C ) } / { ( r + λ ) ( A − wR
e + C ) + q(θ)( A − ( wR
e − wF* ) },
(7)
which givesγ as a function of the labor market tightness parameter, θ.  Consequently,
firms with idiosyncratic arrival rates of encounters γj ∈ [γ , 1 ] find it optimal to use11
employee referrals and pay efficiency wages, while firms with arrival rates γj ∈ [ 0 ,γ ]
find it optimal to hire formally and pay the market wage.  The critical value that triggers
the use of referrals falls as the cost of tolerating shirking increases (i.e., φ decreases), the
cost of holding a vacancy falls (i.e., C falls), workers’ productivity increases (i.e., A
increases), and the separation rate falls (i.e., λ falls).
Workers’ Choices of Search Methods
In practice, workers typically concentrate on a few methods when searching for
work.
11  In the model, this dichotomy is captured by assuming workers use either formal
methods or social networks.
Unemployed workers observe the wages paid by firms hiring through each method
and focus their search accordingly.  In particular, worker i chooses the search method that
maximizes the value of being unemployed.  As for firms, the workers’ benefit of using
referrals rises with the arrival rates of encounters, βi.   Workers connected to larger
networks find it easier to rely on referrals, while workers with smaller networks prefer
relying on formal methods.  The critical value of the arrival rate of encounters which
makes a worker indifferent between the two methods is
β = { κπ( φA − b + C ) } / { ( 1 − ρ )ê²[ r + λ + (1−π)q(θ) + πp(θ) ] }.
(8)
Consequently, workers with idiosyncratic arrival rates of encounters with network
members βi ∈ [β , 1 ] find it optimal to rely on employee referrals to find jobs, while
workers with arrival rates βi ∈ [ 0 ,β ] find it optimal to search formally.  The critical
value that triggers search through referrals falls as the disutility of effort, ê, decreases; the
                                                          
11 See, for example, the evidence presented by Holzer (1988).12
cost of peer pressure, ρ, decreases; the probability of being caught shirking, κ, decreases;
the separation rate, λ, increases; and unemployment benefits, b, increase.
The split of firms and workers into the two search methods indicates that, in case 2,
the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market, where referrals match
‘good’ high-paying jobs to well-connected workers and formal methods match less
attractive jobs to less-connected workers.
Vacancy Creation
To close the model, the vacancy and unemployment rates need to be determined.
The vacancy rate is pinned down using the free-entry condition.  Since firms’ network size
is only realized after entry, free-entry implies that the expected value of a vacancy must be
zero,
γ  VF* + ( 1 −γ ) VR
e = 0,
(9)
where ( 1 −γ ) andγ are the probabilities of using referrals and formal methods; VF* is
the value a formal vacancy which offers market wages, and VR
e is the value of a referral
vacancy which offers efficiency wages, and their corresponding Bellman equations are
rVR
e = − C + E[ γj q(θ)( A − wR
e
 + C ) / ( r + λ + γjq(θ) ) | R ],
rVF* = − C + [ q(θ)( φA − wF* + C ) / ( r + λ + q(θ) ) ].
The free-entry condition above provides a relationship betweenγ and the labor
market tightness parameter, θ.  Equation (7), which determines the split of firms between
the two search methods, provides the other relationship betweenγ and θ.  Figures 1a and
1b graph the search behavior and free-entry conditions in θ -γ space, and determine the
equilibrium values ofγ and θ.13
Steady-State Unemployment
The unemployment rate is determined by the steady-state condition.  In steady-
state, the flow into unemployment for workers hired through both methods has to be equal
to the flow out of unemployment for workers searching through both methods.  Thus, the
steady-state condition is
λ( 1 – u ) =β p(θ)u + ( 1 −β ) E[ βi p(θ)u | R ].
where ( 1 – u ) and u are the shares of employed and unemployed workers, and ( 1 −β )
andβ are the shares of workers using referrals and formal methods, respectively.  Solving
for the unemployment rate yields,
u = 2λ / { 2λ + p(θ)[ 2β + ( 1 –β )( 1 –β² ) ] },
(10)
which falls withβ.  That is, greater search through referrals increases the unemployment
rate because referral networks are less efficient in generating contacts.  In addition,
externalities in search further increase unemployment since workers’ reliance on referrals
generates congestion in social networks.
C.  Matching, Labor Market Segmentation, and Unemployment Benefits
In case 2, the matching process generates labor market segmentation, with well-
connected workers using referrals to jump job queues for good jobs and those with less
connections searching formally.  This division of firms and workers between referrals and
formal search is, however, unlikely to be efficient because of congestion externalities in
search.  Workers deciding to search through referrals consider their probability of
obtaining ‘good’ jobs without considering the negative effects of their decisions on others.
By searching through referrals, workers lower everyone else’s probability of getting good14
jobs and this congestion implies that ‘too many’ people search through referrals making
unemployment inefficiently high.
Policies that reduce the use of referrals move unemployment closer to its optimal
level.  For example, a reduction in unemployment benefits reduces workers’ reliance on
referrals,
dβ/db = −κπ / { (1−ρ)ê²[r + λ + (1−π)q(θ) + πp(θ)] } + dβ/dθ × dθ/db < 0.
This is because unemployment benefits implicitly subsidize search, so a reduction in
unemployment benefits induce workers to rely on faster search methods.  In addition, the
reduction in unemployment benefits lowers the efficiency wages paid by firms hiring
through referrals, making referral jobs less attractive.
This reduction in use of referrals unambiguously lowers unemployment, because
workers rely on faster search methods and there is less congestion in search.  This is
captured by the first term in the comparative statics of the unemployment rate with respect
to b,
du/db = du/dβ × dβ/db + du/dθ × dθ/db,
where, as shown above, du/dβ < 0 and dβ/db < 0.  The second term, however, can be
either positive or negative depending on whether π is high or low.  For low π, a reduction
in unemployment benefits reduces unemployment not only because workers rely more on
formal methods, thus reducing congestion, but also because formal and referral wages fall
and firms generate more vacancies.
III.  Evidence on Employee Referrals and Industry Wage Premia
The model in the previous section establishes a theoretical link between employee
referrals and wage premia.  In particular, the model suggests the reason why referred15
workers earn higher wages is that they are hired by firms paying wage premia to avoid
shirking.  In this section, I explore this idea empirically.
A.  Evidence from Industry Data
To investigate the relation between use of employee referrals and inter-industry
wage premia, I merge data on industry wage premia, percent of referrals by sector, and
industry characteristics from various sources.  I use two measures of industry premia
estimated by Krueger and Summers (1987) using the 1984 Current Population Survey
(CPS), with and without labor quality controls where the controls include education and its
square, six age dummies, eight occupation dummies, gender and race dummies, a central
city dummy, a union member dummy, an ever married dummy, veteran status, and
interactions of marriage, education, and age with gender.  I estimate the percentage of
workers referred by current employees in two-digit industries from the 1982 National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  The advantage of using data from the 1982 NLSY
is that it contains precise information on whether workers hired in a particular industry
were referred by current employees.
12  I use the 1984 CPS to estimate the average years of
education and potential experience in two-digit industries.  Finally, I obtain data on
industry characteristics for two-digit industries from the National Organizations Survey
(NOS), including the percent of unionized workers in the industry, industry concentration,
and average establishment size, sales and assets in the industry.
13
                                                          
12 Since in 1982 the NLSY asked workers whether their jobs were found through personal references from
current employees, this provides a measure of referrals which closely captures the peer monitoring story
presented in the previous section.  A shortcoming of the NLSY is that it only includes persons between the
ages of 14 and 27.  However, the use of these data is unlikely to introduce significant positive biases, since
not only do older workers use personal contacts more extensively than younger workers (Granovetter, 1995;
Corcoran et al., 1980) but they are also more likely to be hired in high-wage sectors.
13 The NOS surveyed a representative sample of work establishments in the U.S. in 1991.  The probability
sample of all types, sizes and ages of establishments used to generate the data set was obtained from16
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the industry data in the full sample and in
the sub-samples of industries relying more and less on employee referrals.  The percent of
referred workers in two-digit industries goes from 10.9% to 57.8%, with a mean of 38%
and a standard deviation of 9.3%.  The table shows that industries where the use of
employee referrals is above the mean pay higher industry premia, have workers with
higher average experience and lower average education, and have a higher percentage of
unionized workers, larger establishments, higher concentration, and higher average sales
and assets.  Table 2 shows correlations of the percent of referred workers and various
industry characteristics.  The correlation between the percent of referred workers and wage
premia are 0.4 and 0.34 for measures with and without labor quality controls.  In addition,
the percent of referred workers is positively correlated with factors generally associated
with high-wage industries.  In particular, the correlations between percent of referred
workers and average experience and percent union are 0.39 and 0.25.  In addition, the
correlations between percent referred and average industry concentration, and average
establishment size, sales and assets are 0.18, 0.28, 0.2, and 0.07, respectively.  In contrast,
percent referred is negatively correlated with average education in the industry (an
important measure of labor quality), suggesting against an unobserved ability story of
referrals if one believes that observed and unobserved labor quality are positively
correlated.
The correlation between percent referred and industry premia in Table 2 may be
reflecting the higher experience or unionization rates of referred workers rather than any
                                                                                                                                                                              
information provided by respondents to the 1991 General Social Survey (GSS).  The 1991 GSS was used to
construct the sample because in this year the GSS asked questions on work organizations, including the
names, addresses, and phone numbers of respondents’ employers.  This national database was then17
direct relation between referrals and industry premia.
14  Table 3 reports the correlation
between percent referred and industry premia after controlling for other industry
characteristics.  The results show positive correlations between both the labor quality
adjusted and unadjusted measures of industry premia and percent referred, after controlling
for average experience, average education, percent unionized, industry concentration, and
average establishment size, sales and assets in the industry.  The correlation using the
labor quality adjusted measure controlling for all industry characteristics indicates that
industries where 10% more of the workforce was hired through referrals pay premia which
are 0.1 higher or, equivalently, the difference in the wage premium paid in the insurance
and the machinery production sectors.
B.  Evidence from Micro-data
The industry level data provides some evidence suggesting referred workers earn
higher wages because they are hired into high-wage sectors.  However, it may be that
referred workers earn higher wages because they have higher unobserved ability.  I use
individual-level data from the NLSY to control for individual fixed-effects in wage
regressions with an indicator of whether the person was referred by a current employee.
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the 1982 NLSY sample used for the
analysis.  The sample is restricted to workers who are not self-employed, in school, or in
the military at the time of the 1982 interview.  The first column shows descriptive
                                                                                                                                                                              
supplemented with aggregate data from various government sources on the characteristics of the industries in
which the establishments operate.
14 Previous work offers mixed evidence on the association between unionization rates and use of referrals.
For example, Holzer (1997) uses Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) data and finds no
association between proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining and firms’ hiring methods.
Koch and Hundley (1997) use data from a survey of human resources practices conducted at Columbia
University and find that unionized firms are less likely to use employee referrals, newspapers ads, walk-ins18
statistics for this sample.  The characteristics of this sample reflect the focus on young
workers.  Average hourly wages in the sample are $6.16, average experience and tenure
are 4 and 1.6 years, average schooling is 11.6 years, and only 27% of those in the sample
are married, only 3% found their current job through a union, but more than half are
employed in the retail and service sectors.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 contrast the characteristics of individuals who did and
did not find their 1982 job through a referral.  Referred workers are defined as workers
who found their job through a personal contact working with the employer at the time the
person found the job.  Referred workers earn higher wages, are more likely to be male, less
likely to live in an SMSA and are less educated, but have more experience and tenure than
non-referred workers.  More importantly, referred workers are more likely to be employed
in sectors considered as high-wage sectors such as mining, construction, and
manufacturing and less likely to be employed in low-wage sectors such as personal and
public sector services.  In contrast, referred workers are less likely to have found their job
through a union contact and probably less likely to be affiliated to a union.
15
Table 5 presents results from regressions of log hourly wages on a referral dummy,
an interaction of the referral dummy with tenure, and a number of controls including male,
race and marital status dummies, education, experience and experience squared, tenure and
tenure squared, a dummy for whether the current job was found through a union contact, a
dummy for whether the person lived in an SMSA, and interactions of marital status with
the male dummy and tenure.  Columns 1 and 2 report the results of regressions estimated
                                                                                                                                                                              
and private employment agencies, but just as likely to use government employment agencies as non-
unionized firms.19
in levels, with and without industry controls.  The results show that referred workers earn
hourly wages that are 8% higher than those of non-referred workers, controlling for
whether the job was found through a union contact to be sure that the referral premium is
not simply capturing union rents.  However, the results in Column 2 show that the “return”
to being referred becomes insignificant once sector dummies are included, suggesting that
the referral premium is associated with sector of employment.
As already indicated, it is possible that referred workers are both employed in high-
wage sectors and have higher unobserved ability (although, as noted, they have lower
schooling).  Columns (3)-(6) present fixed-effects regressions which control for time-
invariant individual effects.  Controls in fixed-effects regressions include male, race, and
marital status dummies, experience, tenure, a dummy for whether the current job was
found through a union contact, and interactions of marital status with a male dummy and
tenure, and differences in schooling and differences in whether the person lived in an
SMSA between 1981 and 1982.  Column (3) shows a slightly smaller referral premium in
the fixed-effects regression compared to the levels regression, suggesting that unobserved
ability can account at most for a small part of the referral premium.
16  As before, however,
the “returns” to referrals become insignificant after controlling for industry dummies,
suggesting that the reason why referred workers earn higher wages is associated with
sector of employment.  The next two columns limit the analysis to industry-switchers,
since if referrals are mainly capturing the premia associated with certain industries then the
referral premium should be higher for industry-switchers than for industry-stayers.
                                                                                                                                                                              
15 While the NSLY does not have information about union affiliation in 1982, it does ask workers whether
they found their current job through a union contact.  Since having found a job through a union contact is
likely to be related to union affiliation, this variable is used as a proxy for union membership.20
Column (5) shows indeed a higher referral premium of 17% for industry-switchers.  As
before, however, the referral premium disappears once the current sector of employment is
controlled for, suggesting that what matters is what sectors referred workers switched into.
C.  Other Possible Explanations of the Referral Premium
The evidence presented above suggests that referred workers earn higher wages
because they are hired into high-wage sectors.  This evidence is consistent with the view
that workers use referrals to jump to the front of the queue for high-paying jobs.
Moreover, an explanation of referrals as simply a way of getting good jobs is also
consistent with the lower quit rates of both referred workers and of workers employed in
high-wage sectors found in the data.
Two alternative explanations have been offered, however, for the referral premium
based on the view that referrals provide additional information to firms or workers.
Referrals may provide information to firms about the unobserved ability of heterogeneous
workers, allowing firms to hire the most productive workers (see Saloner (1985) and
Montgomery (1991) for models of this type).  Alternatively, referrals may provide
prospective job applicants with information about match-quality, allowing them to self-
select into those jobs in which they are most productive (see Staiger (1990) and Simon and
Warner (1992)).  While both of these explanations of referrals can explain why referred
workers earn higher wages, they cannot explain why the referral premium should be
associated with sector of employment (or why industry-level use of referrals should be
associated with industry premia).  Moreover, evidence from the NLSY shows that the
referral premium does not go away once controlling for individual fixed-effects,
                                                                                                                                                                              
16 This estimate is necessarily less precise (i.e., p-value of 0.065) because of the smaller sample when21
suggesting that the referral premium cannot be explained by a standard worker
heterogeneity story (i.e., time-invariant individual effects).  A less standard worker
heterogeneity story with two sectors (one with an ability-sensitive and one with a less-
ability sensitive technology) like the one offered by Montgomery (1991), however, would
be able to explain the relation between referrals and wages across sectors.  On the other
hand, while match-quality explanations can explain why referred workers have lower quit
rates, heterogeneous ability explanations cannot explain this empirical regularity.
 
IV.  Conclusion
This paper develops an equilibrium matching model in which high-wage firms rely
on referrals to fill jobs.  Referrals lower monitoring costs since high-effort referees can
exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lower efficiency wages.  The cost
of using referrals is that they provide fewer contacts for workers and firms.  Heterogeneity
in the size of referral networks implies that while some firms and workers may prefer to
use referrals, others are better off using formal methods.  In equilibrium, the matching
process generates segmentation in the labor market: referrals match ‘good’ high-paying
jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods match less attractive jobs to less-
connected workers.  Congestion externalities, however, may imply an inefficient split of
firms and workers between the two search methods.  This means that while well-connected
workers may do well by using referrals to jump queues for good jobs, the unemployment
rate would be lower if workers “at the margin” were induced to search formally.
The model suggests referred workers earn higher wages and have lower quit rates
because referrals are a way of getting a good job.  This paper provides new empirical
                                                                                                                                                                              
estimating the regression in differences.22
evidence showing that industry-level use of referrals to fill job vacancies is correlated with
industry wage premia (adjusting for worker skills).  Moreover, evidence from the NLSY
shows similar OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the referral premium, suggesting that
unobserved ability is not accounting for the higher wages earned by referred workers.
Finally, the results show that the referral premium disappears when sector dummies are
included, suggesting that the referral premium is associated to sector of employment.23
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
The no-shirking condition (NSC) for a referred worker is
 ER = SR,
( wR
e
 − ê² ) + λ( UR − ER ) = ( wR
e
 − ê² ) + ( λ + κ )( UR − ER ),
( ER − UR ) = ( 1 − ρ )ê² / κ,
Adding and subtracting rUR in equation (3a), and then substituting rUR from equation (5a)
and ( ER − UR ) from above, I obtain wR
e:
wR
e = ê² + λ( ER − UR ) + rER,
wR
e = ê² + ( r + λ )( ER − UR ) − b +  E[ βip(θ)( ER – UR ) | R ],
wR
e = ê² − b + ( r + λ + E[ βip(θ) | R ] )( 1 − ρ )ê² / κ,
wR
e = ê² − b + ( r + λ + ( 1 −β² ) p(θ)/2 )( 1 − ρ )ê² / κ,
whereβ is the arrival rate of encounters which makes workers indifferent between hiring
through referrals and formal methods.
Using the NSC for formal hires and solving as described above yields the rents earned by
workers hired formally, ( EF − U F
 ) = ê² / κ.  The lowest wage satisfying the NSC for
formal hires is
wF
e = ê² − b + ( r + λ + p(θ) )ê² / κ.
Comparing the formal and referral efficiency wages:
( wF
e − wR
e ) = [ ( ρ +β² ) p(θ)/2 + ( r + λ ) ρ ] ê² / κ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Subtracting (2a) from (1) and rearranging yields the surplus for firms hiring through
referrals,
( JR − VR ) = ( φA − wR + C ) / ( r + λ + ( 1 −γ² ) q(θ)/2 ),28
whereγ is the arrival rate of encounters which makes firms indifferent between hiring
through referrals and formal channels.  Similarly, subtracting (5a) from (3a) and
rearranging yields the surplus for workers hired through referrals,
( ER − UR ) = ( wR − b ) / ( r + λ + ( 1 −β² ) p(θ)/2 ).
The market wage paid by firms hiring through referrals is obtained by replacing the firms’
and workers’ surpluses into equation (6):
(1 − π)[(wR* − b)/(r + λ + (1 −β²)p(θ)/2)] = π[(φA − wR* + C)/(r + λ + (1 −γ²)q(θ)/2)].
Solving for the referral market wage yields,
wR* = { π[ r + λ + ( 1 −β² )p(θ)/2 ]( φA + C ) + (1−π)[ r + λ + ( 1 −γ² )q(θ)/2 ]b } /
{ r + λ + (1−π)( 1 −γ² )q(θ)/2 + π( 1 −β² )p(θ)/2 }.
Similarly, subtracting (2b) from (1) and rearranging yields the surplus for firms hiring
formally,
( JF − VF ) = ( φA − wF + C ) / ( r + λ + q(θ) ).
Subtracting (5b) from (3b) and rearranging yields the surplus for workers hired formally,
( EF − UF ) = ( wF − b ) / (r + λ + p(θ) ).
The market wage paid by firms hiring formally is obtained by replacing the firms’ and
workers’ surpluses into equation (6):
(1 − π)[ ( wF* − b ) / ( r + λ + p(θ))] = π[ ( φA − wF* + C ) / ( r + λ + q(θ) )].
Solving for the formal market wage yields,
wF* = { π ( r + λ + p(θ) )( φA + C ) + (1−π)( r + λ + q(θ) )b } /
{ r + λ + (1−π)q(θ) + πp(θ) }.
Comparing the formal and referral market wages yields,
( wF* − wR* ) = − (r + λ)(q(θ) − p(θ)) + [γ² q(θ)(r + λ − p(θ)) −β² p(θ)(r + λ − q(θ))] < 0.
So, sufficient conditions for ( wF* − wR* ) < 0 are:29
(i)  (q(θ) − p(θ)) > 0, and
(ii)  [ γ² q(θ) ( r + λ − p(θ) ) −β² p(θ) ( r + λ − q(θ) ) ] > 0,
and both hold if q(θ) is sufficiently greater than p(θ).
Critical Values that Trigger Referral Search
In case 2, firm j chooses the search method that maximizes its value of a vacancy by
comparing VRj
e and VF*, where these are given by the following Bellman equations,
rVRj
e = − C + γjq(θ) [ ( A − wR
e
 + C ) / ( r + λ + γjq(θ) ) ],
rVF* = − C + q(θ) [ ( φA − wF* + C ) / ( r + λ + q(θ) ) ].
The critical value that triggers use of referrals,γ, is obtained by equating VRj
e and VF* and
is given by equation (7).
Similarly, worker i chooses the search method that maximizes the value of being
unemployed by comparing URi
e and UF*, which are given by
rURi
e = − b + βi p(θ) [ ( wR
e
 − b ) / ( r + x + βi p(θ) ) ],
rUF* = − b + p(θ)[ ( wF* − b ) / ( r + x + p(θ) ) ].
The critical value that triggers use of referrals,β, is obtained by equating URj
e and UF* and
is given by equation (8).
Slope of the Free-Entry (FE) Curve
Totally differentiating the free-entry condition (9) with respect to θ, yields the slope of the
free-entry curve,
dγ /dθ = { − ( 1 −γ )q´(θ)( A − wR
e + C ) E[ γj / ( r + x + γjq(θ) ) ]
+ ( 1 −γ )q(θ) E[ γj / ( r + x + γjq(θ) ) ]  × dwR
e/dθ
− [γq´(θ)(1−q(θ))( φA − wF
* +C ) / ( r + λ + q(θ) ) ]
+ [γq(θ) / ( r + λ + q(θ) ) ] × dwF
*/dθ } /
{ − q(θ)[( A − wR
e + C ) E[γj / ( r + x + γjq(θ) ) ]
− [ ( φA − wF
* + C ) / ( r + λ + q(θ) )] −γ / ( r + λ + q(θ) ) } < 0,30
where the numerator is positive since q´(θ) < 0 and dwR
e/dθ > 0 and dwF
*/dθ > 0, and the
denominator is negative since profits out of a referral hire are higher than out of a formal
hire.  Thus, the free-entry condition is unambiguously downwardly sloping.
Slope of the Search Behavior (SB) Curve
Totally differentiating equation (7) with respect to θ, yields the slope of the search
behavior curve. Since the denominator of the derivative is the square of the original
denominator, then the sign of the slope is the same as the sign of the numerator of the
derivative,
dγ /dθ ∝ − ( r + λ + q(θ) )( A − wR
e + C ) × dwF
*/dθ
+ ( r + x + q(θ) )( φA − wF
* + C ) × dwR
e/dθ
− q´(θ)( A − ( wR
e − wF
* ) )( φA − wF
* + C ) − q(θ)φA × dwF
*/dθ,
where q´(θ) < 0 and dwR
e/dθ > 0 and dwF
*/dθ > 0, so the first and the last terms are
negative and the second and third terms are positive.  However, as π decreases, dwR
e/dθ
increases so that the second term becomes larger and it is more likely for dγ /dθ  to be
positive.  On the contrary, as π increases, dwR
e/dθ decreases so that the second term is
smaller and it is more likely for dγ /dθ to be negative.  There are two effects at work here.
An increase in labor market tightness, θ, reduces the arrival rate of applicants, q(θ), and
makes firms want to rely more on formal methods.  On the other hand, a higher θ increases
wF
* and make firms want to rely more on referrals.  If π is low, the first effect dominates
and the search behavior curve slopes upward as in Figure 1a.  If π is high, the second
effect dominates and the search behavior curve slopes downward as in Figure 1b.
Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Critical Value of Referral Search
Totally differentiating equation (8) with respect to b yields
dβ/db = − κπ / { (1−ρ)ê²[ r + x + (1−π)q(θ) + πp(θ) ] } + dβ/dθ × dθ/db,31
The first term is clearly negative.  The second term can also be shown to be negative both
for low and high values of π.  Note that
dβ/dθ =βκ{ − π( φA − b + C )[ (1−π)q´(θ) + πp´(θ) ] } /
{ ( 1 − ρ )ê²[ r + λ + (1−π)q(θ) + πp(θ) ] }².
Since q´(θ) < 0 and p´(θ) > 0, dβ/dθ is positive for low values of π and negative for high
values of π.  The sign of dθ/db is obtained by doing comparative statics of Figures 1a and
1b with respect to b.  Figure 2a shows that, for low values of π, a reduction in b
unambiguously increases θ, while Figure 2b shows that, for high values of π, a reduction
in b unambiguously reduces θ.  This means that dθ/db is negative for low values of π and
positive for high values of π.  Consequently, the second term in dβ/db is always negative.
Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Unemployment Rate
Totally differentiating equation (10) with respect to b yields,
du/db = du/dβ × dβ /db + du/dθ × dθ/db,
where, as shown above, du/dβ < 0 and dβ/db < 0, so the first term is positive. The
second term can be either positive or negative depending on whether π is high or low.
Since du/dθ < 0, the second term is also positive for low values of π but negative for high
values of π.Figure 1.a: Equilibrium with Low π
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Full Sample Industries Above Mean
of % Referred in all
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N3 6 1 9 1 7
Notes:
  The table shows means for variables at the industry 2-digit SIC level.  Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  The
first column shows the means for the full sample, while the second column shows the means for the industries where the
percent of referred workers was above 38% and the third column shows the means for industries where the percent of
referred workers was below 38%. The percent referred are calculated as the percent of workers in the NLSY in 1982 who
found jobs through friends working with the employer at the time the job was found.  The industry wage premia are the
returns to industry affiliation estimated by Krueger and Summers (1987) with cross-sectional data from the 1984 CPS at the
2-digit SIC level, with and without the following controls: education, age, sex, race, union, status, a central city dummy,
marital status, and several interaction of marital status with sex and age.  Average experience and average education for
each 2-digit industry where estimated using the 1984 CPS.  The rest of the industry characteristics (i.e., % union, industry




















































































































































  The table presents pairwise correlations of the variables described in Table 1.  The number of observations for each pairwise
correlation is in parenthesis.Table 3: Regressions of Industry Wage Premia
Unadjusted Industry Wage Premia Quality Adjusted Industry Wage Premia















































NO NO YES NO NO YES
R² 0.359 0.392 0.593 0.5 0.615 0.694
N3 6 3 3 3 2 3 6 3 3 3 2
Notes: The table presents coefficients of regressions of unadjusted industry premia in Columns (1)-(3) and of quality
adjusted premia in Columns (4)-(6).  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  The other industry controls included in columns
(3) and (6) are: the industry concentration, and the average establishment size, sales and assets in the sector.Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, NLSY 1982







% Male 55.38 57.49 50.75
% White 72.95 72.63 73.67
% Black 21.59 22.02 20.63
% Other Race 5.46 5.35 5.7



















% Living in SMSA 74.35 73.56 76.08
% Union Found Job 3.02 2.97 3.14
% Mining 1.57 1.83 1.01
% Construction 8.76 8.97 8.29
% Manufacturing 24.47 27.6 17.59
% Transportation 5.46 5.14 6.16




% Business Services 6.44 6.69 5.9
% Personal Services 5.03 3.65 8.04




% Public Sector 4.24 3.31 6.28
% Industry-Switchers
from 1981 to 1982
35.08 34.97 35.33
N 2,142 1,410 732
Notes: The table reports means and percentages in 1982. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis
where appropriate.  The first column provides descriptive statistics on the full sample, while the second
column provides statistics on the sample of referred workers and the third column on the sample of
workers who found their jobs through other methods.  Referred workers are defined as workers who
found their job through a personal contact working with the employer at the time the person found the
job.Table 5:  Effects of Referrals on Hourly Wages for Industry-Switchers
and Industry-Stayers, NLSY
Levels First Differences
Full Sample Full Sample Industry-Switchers

























Industry Dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
R² 0.226 0.298 0.012 0.08 0.025 0.123
N 2,142 2,142 1,562 1,559 544 544
Notes:  The table reports coefficients of wage regressions estimated in levels in Columns (1) and (2) and estimated in
first differences in Columns (3)-(6).  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.   The first four columns estimate the
regressions on the full sample, while the last two columns limit the analysis to the sample of workers who switched
industries from 1981 to 1982.  The levels regressions include male and marital status dummies, race dummies,
education, experience and experience squared, tenure and tenure squared, a dummy for whether the person lived in an
SMSA, a dummy for whether the person found job through a union, and interactions of marital status with the male
dummy and tenure.  The regressions in first differences include male, marital status, and race dummies, interaction of
marital status with the male dummy, tenure, a dummy for whether person found job through a union, and differences
in schooling and differences in whether the person lived in an SMSA from 1981 to 1982.  In addition, Columns (2),
(4), and (6) control for industry affiliation.